

Democracy in Post-Gaddafi Libya: Institutional Vacuum, Insecurity, and the Failure of International Engagement .

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ABSTRACT

The 2011 Arab Uprising that led to the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's 42-year authoritarian regime raised high expectations for democratic transition in Libya. The successful holding of the first free elections in 52 years in July 2012 initially signaled a promising democratic future. However, this electoral milestone failed to translate into a stable democracy, and the country descended into prolonged political fragmentation, insecurity, and institutional collapse.

This project examines why Libya's democratic transition has failed despite favorable initial conditions. It addresses three central research questions: Why has the democratic transition failed so far? What can be done to enhance this transition? And why did international actors largely abandon the country after the intervention, leaving state-building to inexperienced local actors?

The study adopts a qualitative research methodology based on secondary data collection. Data were obtained from academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles, institutional reports (including UNSMIL, RAND Corporation, NED-IFDS, and Congressional Research Service), and online scholarly sources. No statistical analysis is employed, given the exploratory and interpretive nature of the topic.

The analysis shows that elections alone do not constitute democracy. Drawing on definitions by Morlino (1998, 2002) and Sodaro (2004), the study argues that essential democratic conditions such as rule of law, institutional checks and balances, civil society, and protection of human rights are absent in Libya. Key factors for failure include: (1) The legacy of Gaddafi's doctrine of statelessness which systematically destroyed state institutions and civil society; (2) The disengagement of international actors (NATO, US, UN) after the intervention, with only a small UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) lacking executive authority; (3) Pervasive insecurity due to failure to disarm militias, leading to the rise of hybrid security groups (Supreme Security Committee, Libya Shield Force) and jihadist groups; (4)

Political and economic challenges, including weak governance, oil facility blockades, and lack of transitional justice.

Democratic transition in Libya is not impossible but requires long-term, collective effort. The paper recommends a comprehensive framework focused on: supporting a national reconciliation and disarmament process, strengthening National Security Forces and border security, rebuilding public administration, and ensuring institutional constraints based on transparency, trust-building beyond tribe, transitional justice, and an inclusive constitutional process. The experience demonstrates that democracy cannot be created ex nihilo and requires foundational state-building.

الملخص:

رفعت انتفاضة العالم العربي عام 2011، والتي أدت إلى سقوط نظام معمر القذافي الذي دام 42 عاماً، سقف التوقعات بالتحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا. وقد بشر النجاح في إجراء أول انتخابات حرة منذ 52 عاماً في يوليو 2012 بمستقبل ديمقراطي واعد في البداية. ومع ذلك، تعثر هذا الإنجاز الانتخابي في الترجمة إلى ديمقراطية مستقرة، وانزلت البلاد إلى انقسام سياسي، و صراع أمني، وانهيار مؤسسي. يبحث هذا المشروع في أسباب تعثر التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا على الرغم من الظروف الأولية المواتية. ويجب على ثلاثة أسئلة بحثية مركزية:

لماذا تعثر التحول الديمقراطي حتى الآن؟

ما الذي يمكن فعله لتعزيز هذا التحول؟

لماذا أصبح دور الأطراف الدولية الفاعلة محدود جداً في عملية إعادة بناء مؤسسات لدولة؟ تعتمد الدراسة منهجية البحث النوعي القائمة على جمع البيانات الثانوية. حيث تم الحصول على البيانات من الكتب الأكاديمية، والمقالات المنشورة في المجلات العلمية المحكمة، والتقارير المؤسسية (بما في ذلك تقارير بعثة الأمم المتحدة للدعم في ليبيا، ومؤسسة راند، والصندوق الوطني للديمقراطية، وخدمة أبحاث الكونغرس)، بالإضافة إلى المصادر العلمية عبر الإنترنت. ولم يتم استخدام التحليل الإحصائي نظراً للطبيعة الاستكشافية والتفسيرية للموضوع. يُظهر التحليل أن الانتخابات وحدها لا تصنع ديمقراطية. وبالاستناد إلى تعريفات مورليانو (1998، 2002) وسودارو (2004)، تجادل الدراسة بأن الشروط الديمقراطية الأساسية مثل سيادة القانون، والضوابط والتوازنات المؤسسية، والمجتمع المدني، وحماية حقوق الإنسان غائبة في ليبيا. وتشمل العوامل الرئيسية للفشل ما يلي:

انسحاب الأطراف الدولية الفاعلة (حلف الناتو، الولايات المتحدة، الأمم المتحدة) بعد التدخل، مع الاكتفاء ببعثة أممية صغيرة للدعم في ليبيا (UNSMIL) تفتقر إلى السلطة التنفيذية. الانفلات الأمني المستمر بسبب الفشل في نزع سلاح في ليبيا. و أيضاً التحديات السياسية والاقتصادية، بما في ذلك ضعف الحوكمة، وإغلاق المنشآت النفطية، وغياب العدالة الانتقالية.

وتوصي الورقة بإطار عمل شامل يركز على: دعم عملية المصالحة الوطنية ونزع السلاح، تعزيز قوات الأمن الوطني وأمن الحدود، إعادة بناء الإدارة العامة، وضمان القيود المؤسسية القائمة على الشفافية، وبناء الثقة العابرة للقبيلة، والعدالة الانتقالية، وعملية دستورية شاملة للجميع.

الكلمات المفتاحية:

ليبيا، التحول الديمقراطي، بناء الدولة ما بعد النزاع، الربيع العربي، بعثة الأمم المتحدة للدعم في ليبيا (UNSMIL)، إصلاح قطاع الأمن .

الكلمات المفتاحية: الديمقراطية في ليبيا ما بعد القذافي: الفراغ المؤسسي، الانفلات الأمني، وفشل التدخل الدولي.

INTRODUCTION

The idea of democratic transition in Libya could be traced to the advent of Arab uprising, which had effect on the Arab World generally. The outcomes of this uprising in Egypt and Tunisia gave hope of democracy to other countries in the region where by there were peaceful change of governments in the two countries. But unfortunately, this uprising has resulted to civil war in other Arab countries like Libya and Syria. Economic crisis resulted to the conflict and people were fed up with the long-term regime and the regime-response determined the result of the uprising. The totality of authoritarianism that characterized Libyan and Syrian rule resulted in conflict-driven regime change. In Libya, mass demonstration precipitated to extended periods of fighting between Gaddafi forces and opposition groups across the country. But with the support of NATO coalition forces, Gaddafi regime was demolished. After a precarious transition, there was first election in the country in July 2012 with fair outcomes. This demonstrated the faith of democratic transition in Libya but reverse later became the case (Rishita, A, etal 2013: 3).

This project would argue that the experience of election in the country for first time in 52 years did not guarantee a successful democratic transition in the country. The country is presently in state of crisis whereby there is no assurance of democracy prevailing at the aftermath of Gaddafi regime. The regime left behind a malfunctioning state, weak governmental institutions and little to no civil society that are necessary for building democracy. There are different challenges facing the present administrations in the country. The current government has been unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. There was emergence of insecurity in the country as result of 2011 conflict whereby armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders constituted the most

powerful arbiters of public affairs. There was prevalence of violence among various forces in Tripoli and Benghazi since mid-2014, which emerged as result of overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries (Varvelli A. 2014, p.7).

However, Libya had a better opportunity to successfully transition to democracy after the collapse of the regime than other neighbouring states with the same uprisings considering some prevailing conditions in the country. There was a little possibility for the development of pro-regime insurgency in Libya unlike Iraq; the rebels were unified, as well as democratic political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt looked conducive to Libya's transition to peace (Chivvis C.S & Martini J. 2014, p.1). But the expected state of peace turned to be state of chaos. The established interim authorities failed to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. This would lead us to the question of why democratic transition in the country has been failing so far? What can be done to enhance this transition? Why did international actors abandon the country after the fall of Gaddafi leaving the critical work of state building for the local inexperienced Libyans to do? These are the research questions that would be examined in the content of this project.

RESEARCH METHOD

The aim of this project is to examine the reasons why Libyan democratic transition failed and what can be done to facilitate democracy in the country. The project shall use qualitative method of research and secondary method of data collection, whereby the necessary data shall be obtained using the written materials from different authors, books from the library and Internet sources. There will not be any statistical data analysis in the project and this research method is found preferable due to the nature of the research topic.

DEMOCRACY

In order to examine the democratic transition in Libya, this project finds it necessary to define what democracy is all about. This would shed light to the necessary factors that are expected to prevail in the country before it can be regarded as a democratic state. The term democracy is one of the most popular terms in social sciences generally and different scholars regard several features of democracy. Morlino L. (1998 & 2002, p.2), argues that democratic regime has at least; universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information. According to Sodaro M.J (2004, p. 31), *"The essential idea of*

democracy is that the people have the right to determine who governs them. Through election, they decide the principle-governing officials and also hold them accountable for their actions. Democracy places limitation on the activities of government by ensuring the people with some fundamental rights and freedoms. This author further explains on four faces of democracy, which are; popular sovereignty; rights and liberties; democratic values; and economic democracy (p. 164, 182). The author as well stated ten conditions of a democratic state, which include; "state institutions"; "elites committed to democracy"; "a homogeneous society"; "national wealth"; "private enterprise"; "a middle class"; "support of the disadvantaged for democracy"; "citizen participation, civil society, and a democratic political culture"; "education and freedom of information"; and "a favorable international environment" (p. p.207-220).

Furthermore, it can be seen that there are different definitions of democracy but they share certain similarities. For a state to be democratic in nature there are basic conditions that must inherent in that state such as; free and fair elections, functioning market, democratic institutions, limited role of government (check and balances) and respect for human rights. Considering these basic factors, the only factor that was experienced so far in Libya is election but other features of democracy are perfectly lacking in the country. Election alone does not singularly guarantee democracy in a state looking at the experience of long-term authoritarian regime in the country.

WHY HAS DEMOCRACY FAILED IN LIBYA?

In cross examining the various reasons why democratic transition has failed in the country, there is need to examine different challenges facing the democratic stability of the country using write-ups from different authors. Firstly, the condition of Libya gave high hope of democratic success in the country after the fall of Gaddafi regime but what actually went wrong with expectations of people. One of the most important points to be examined is decreasing interest of international actors after the fall of Gaddafi regime. Despite a significant military investment of international actors to help in overthrowing Gaddafi, it was a surprise news to find out that international actors have done very little to support Libya's post-conflict recovery to date. In an attempt to build democracy in the country, a very small United Nations (UN) mission without executive authority was assigned with the function of stabilizing the country. Both U.S and NATO allies played little role as well (Chivvis C.S & Martini J. 2014: xi). This UN mission known as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was charged with five primary tasks which are;

assisting with democratic transition; preserving human rights and the rule of law; re-establishing internal security; controlling the trade of arms; and improving government capacity (Varvelli A. 2014, p.7).

The decreasing efforts of international actors have great impact on the destabilization of the country. The act of leaving the work of state building and democratic transition for the inexperienced local people to do led to the state of crisis and other political challenges facing the country today. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) also recorded indiscriminate use of military weaponry, abductions, unlawful killings, and the internal displacement of more than 100,000 Libyans during the fighting. The U.S. State Department describes Libya as a "terrorist safe haven." European partners and US tried unsuccessfully to revise and upgrade the mandate. . On 31 of August, Libya's interim government acknowledged that "the majority of the ministries, institutions, and associations" in the capital were no longer under its control and demanded that armed groups should stop from destroying state property (Blanchard C.M, 2014, p.1).

Political challenges could be considered as another reasons why democratic has failed in the country. The outgoing leader of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Tarek Mitri, summarized the political challenges at the root of Libya's conflicts in the following way in an August 27 briefing to the U.N. Security Council: "The Libyan experience illustrates the fact that transition is fraught with great risks, some being due to perceived conflicting interests and mutual fears, the legacy of more than four decades of despotic rule, as well as reactivated enmities and reinvented hatred in the struggle for power. These risks are also those of seeing Libya's future impacted by regional polarization and proxy rivalries. The threat of derailing the movement of change initiated by the revolution is, in all probability, mounting. Reversing the descent into more instability and uncertainty cannot happen unless various actors in Libya's public life commit themselves, in words and in deeds, to a democratic political process. The democratic process cannot be reduced to the ballot box and to the emergence of numerical majorities and minorities. Its progress is conditional on upholding principles of pluralism, inclusivity, separation of powers, [and] adherence to agreed democratic values and norms." (Blanchard C.M, 2014, p.1-2).

Another democratic challenge facing the country is insecurity. Virtually all the problems facing the country can be attributed the abandoning of international actors. Insecurity has been one of the main threats facing the stability of the country since 2011, which has led to many negative repercussions across the country. It has affected functioning political and administrative institutions, as well as facilitating the expansion of criminal and Jihadist

groups. These security problems could be traced back to the failure of the international actors to disarm and demobilize rebel militias after the fall of Gaddafi regime. Though both international actors and leadership of the country clearly understand the important of rebel disarmament but they still failed to carry it out. The process of democratic transition can never be a success until security issues are adequately taken care of (Chivvis C.S & Martini J. 2014: p.x).

Economic challenges also constituted one of the main problems facing the country. The production of oil started all over again at the aftermath of the war and this enabled the country to escape some post-conflict problems to some extent, it helped to fund reconstruction and also the payment of salaries to many groups as well as the militias. By 2013, the armed group took over many oil facilities in the country, which automatically affected the stability of the government to continue with the payment of salaries. The government has taken limited step to find a proper reform in helping the economic of the country. This would make democracy a dream without any possibility of becoming reality in the country because economic sector of a state provides solutions to other sectors (Chivvis C.S & Martini J. 2014: p.xi).

To buttress more on the reasons why democratic transition has failed in the country or challenges of democracy, NEDIFDS Report (2011,p.2-3) stated the following factors as causes of a failed democracy in the country;

1. An Institutional Vacuum: Though the regime of Qaddafi was governed by a set of formal authoritarian institutions, the political reality was vertical system of power whereby decisions were made arbitrarily. Politics is largely un-institutionalized; while providing the benefit of avoiding the legacy of a highly-institutionalized authoritarian regime, this creates the burden of developing basic institutions in order to avert chaos.
2. A Leadership Vacuum: Qaddafi succeeded in eliminating or neutralizing most of the political elite, including many exiled opposition figures. Political parties and opposition groups were nonexistent, and potential political rivals were marginalized so that Qaddafi would remain the sole dominant personality in the political realm.
3. A Divided Society: Divisions between eastern and western and between coastal and inland regions continue to play a prominent role in forming political identities and allegiances, as do tribal affinities,

- albeit to a lesser extent. The rivalry between Benghazi and Tripoli is the most significant of these fissures, with residents of both cities leery of the other gaining dominance.
4. A Weak Security Sector: Unlike Egypt, Libya lacks a sophisticated military establishment. Under the Qaddafi regime, security was heavily privatized and contracted to foreign mercenaries. Military forces received little education and lack organizational coherence and discipline.
 5. Lack of Economic Infrastructure: A two-tier economic system exists with oil largely separated from the rest of the economy, which is largely underdeveloped. The allocation of oil revenues in a democratic Libya raises the risk of resource-based conflict between competing groups.
 6. Integrating the Existing Bureaucracy: Though the state lacks robust institutions, there is a relatively effective bureaucracy that must be integrated within a new system of government in order to avoid alienating a significant pool of people with skills, knowledge, and expertise that will be of vital importance to post-conflict reconstruction and the development of new state institutions.

THE POST-GADDAFI POLITICAL ARENA

The post Gaddafi period is regarded to be the "new Libya" which faced with many challenges such as addressing the humanitarian emergency, damages of the war, economic reconstruction, the question of political reform, lack of functioning state structures, and disunity of the opposition (CSS Analysis in Security, 2011, p.1). Many international and multilateral organizations in the West started thinking about how democracy could flourish in the post-conflict era. Libya's Transitional National Council (TNC) that rules the eastern part of the country published what it labeled "A Vision of a Democratic Libya" on 29 March 2011. This document consisted of all the buzzwords about democratic government and rule of law that appeal to an international community eager to see Qadhafi disappear, and to have any alternative take hold.

Democratic transition in the country encountered with many problems considering the fact that firstly, democracy cannot be created ex nihilo. This means that virtually, all the countries with matured democracies epitomized the fact that democracy only arrived at the end of an often-lengthy process of state building. This process established a number of institutional checks and balances between the state and its citizens, which constitute the main idea behind democratic governance. But quite unfortunate, It can be observed that this process has not even started in Libya. This is really affected by the policies of the Libyan monarchy (1951-1969) but particularly those of

the Qadhafi government since 1969. Since the country got independence, all institutions in civil society that traditionally provide identity to a country's citizens were systematically destroyed in Libya in the pursuit of Qadhafi's notion of statelessness (Vandewalle D. 2011, p.1).

Furthermore, Libya's lack of the institutions to create a modern democracy and also the historical imagination or a history of state-society interaction that augurs very well for a move toward a more democratic political system. According to Vandewalle D. 2011) predicted the fact that if the outcome of the ongoing civil war in Libya lead to removal of Gaddafi regime, the country will face with economic, social, and political challenges. The author explains further that Libya will have to face with the need to restructure its economy away from excessive reliance on the state and on hydrocarbon revenues. The emerging new leaders will need to develop a political formula that is acceptable and practicable to a number of different players including tribes and provinces that were traditionally not friendly with each other but held together artificially by the authoritarian policies of the Gaddafi government. There will be need for creation of law system that would serve all the citizens equally with the construction of political system that guarantees at least a minimum of checks-and-balances so that Libyan citizens feel empowered and true citizens (p.1).

It should be noted that though, Libya is the third Arab country with the experience a situation whereby authoritarian regime has been overthrown by internal popular pressure. But the case of Libya is different when compared with that of Tunisia and Egypt. The political transition in the country must start from the beginning. While the political transition from Cairo and Tunisia came as a result of the fact that the armed forces refused to oppose the interest of the people, which led to the people remonstrating against regimes, the upheaval in Tripoli came as a result of NATO intervention. As it was explained by CSS Analysis in Security, (2011, p.1), the transition in Libya would not face with much antagonism between revolting masses and the remnants of the former oligarchic ruling class. Another reason for the different case in Libya is the fact that the regime and the state cannot be separated from each other. There is no standard constitution that might serve as a foundation for democracy, there are no reliable institutions that could be bases for new order, and also the repression of the Gaddafi regime prevented the formation of civil society organization.

With all the challenges and problems facing Libya in the new era, NEDIFDS Report (2011, p.1-2) stated the following factors as possibilities of democracy flourishing in Libya;

1. Disenchantment with Qaddafist Doctrine: Qaddafist doctrine is an obstacle to representative democracy in the country and few Libyans supported this doctrine whereby there is popular support for free elections and greater mechanisms for accountability.
2. Commitment to Democratic Legitimacy: There is recognition of the need for free and fair multi-party elections to be held after the conflict and for the establishment of a provisional government by NTC. Its representatives expressed their commitment to bringing together intellectuals, human rights leaders, and citizens in any transition process.
3. Beginnings of Local Government: Local councils have transcended tribal allegiances to provide more independent, transparent, and accountable government. Healthy interaction between the NTC and local councils will be critical for ensuring decentralized governance that promotes voice and accountability.
4. Emergence of Civil Society: Emerging civil society organizations offer new opportunities for civic participation and new possibilities to build trust outside traditional institutions of family and tribe.

Furthermore, in looking at the post-Gaddafi political arena, there were no political parties and civil society organizations in the Gaddafi's 42-year rule, which became a great problem for the emergence of political system after the fall of the regime. The Interim National Council was formed in late February. It gained the popular support of the people in defecting military units, state officials and tribal leaders as well as seeking international recognition as the main legitimate representative of the country until the formation of new government. The aims of the council were to institutionalize democracy in the country, conduct a free and fair elections and drafting of constitution. The council was made up of different groups, and it is now dominated by Libyans from the North-east part of the country. As at late 2011, 13 names out of 31 member were publicized and the remaining names were kept as secret for security purpose (Lacher W 2011, p.2).

Political parties and civil society organizations that have been banned in the country for long period of years have now emerged in large numbers and better political atmosphere prevailed in the country in order to prepare for free and fair elections. There were elected interim of 200 members General National Congress (GNC) to replace the appointed TNC, which marked an important move towards democratic transition. Many people in the country believed that the elected interim congress would appoint cabinet that is capable of creating democracy. But the interim government was unable to succeed due to the prevailing democratic challenges in the country. Gaddafi

intentionally undermined state institutions, including the military, and manipulated tribal, regional, and political groups to maintain power. Due to these, Transitional authorities encountered with weak national government institutions, and competition among some groups. Political support for interim leaders have faded due to government's failure to rapidly improve basic services, ensure security, or deliver expected financial support via salaries, subsidies, and relief payments (Blanchard C.M 2012, p.1).

To summarize the political arena of Libya after the fall of Gaddafi; the end of Qaddafi's regime marked the beginning of destabilization of the country. The European politicians, particularly from France and the UK underestimated the difficulty of this transition, hoping for a fast "democratic escalation", as supported by Bernard Henry Levy's mindset. The elections held on July 7th, marked the first turning point in the recent history of the country. Libyan people voted for the General National Congress (GNC), a body enjoying full legislative authority, composed of 200 members and endowed with the power to appoint a new interim government. Generally speaking, the European politicians looked at the election results with optimism. Apparently, unlike other countries where the Arab Spring has brought to power groups related to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Libya has partially escaped this fate (Varvelli A. 2014, p.4).

The September 11th, 2011 attack in Benghazi, whereby Christopher Stevens, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and 3 other U.S. officials lost their lives made clear a progressively developing phenomenon in Libya: the presence of terrorist groups or militias linked to radical Islamism. Western perception rapidly changed. The US and Europe realized that Libya's pacification process was far from being over and that the state-building process, too, was merely at its initial stage. In 2013, clashes between militias or tribes, targeted political assassinations, kidnappings and energy supply blockades took place all over the country, especially in the south and in the east. Terrorist groups are growing stronger, especially in Cyrenaica. NTC started to integrate the militias into the national army, but the program was not successful. The creation of two hybrid security structures, such as the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) and the Libyan Shield Force, with unclear and ambiguous roles and authority, has worsened the framework, adding instability and rivalries to an already fragmented scenario (Varvelli A. 2014, p.4).

On July 27, 2011, the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies convened a meeting of democracy practitioners and leading experts on democratic transitions, post-conflict stabilization, and electoral and constitutional design for the purpose of identifying the challenges and opportunities

confronting Libyans as they attempt to map a democratic future for their country. The meeting addressed Libya's political system, scenarios for post-conflict reconciliation, and options for a democratic transition. The reports of the forum can be discussed as follow:

The Political system of Libya: This is explained from the fact that the representatives of Libya's opposition who attended the meeting buttressed on the possibility of democracy in the country where the aspiration for democracy drove the February uprising, and acknowledged the commitment of the National Transition Council (NTC) to a democratic and united state. The NTC is reviewed to have faced with several challenges in their democratic role like battling Muammar Qaddafi's forces, providing basic services and governance in liberated areas, and setting the groundwork for a democratic transition. NTC recognizes the need to unify various armed groups and to bridge regional and tribal divides by holding numerous meetings with them as well as producing a platform premised on free elections, the rule of law, a multi-party system, and respect for basic human rights. The NTC is carefully monitoring the establishment and operation of civil society groups; it is granting letters of recognition and providing support to these groups, including giving office space and other basic resources required for their operation.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Several authors and sources have suggested different approaches, methods and factors that must be put into strict consideration if Libya successfully wishes to be democratized. This project would try to add to the literature on what could brighten democratic future in the country. Several democratic challenges have been reviewed in this project as reasons why democracy failed in Libya and attempt to suggest solutions is also required. It must be noted that democratic transition in the country would take time and require a lot of concentration, hard works and dedication from both international actors, government of the country and people at the local level. International actors must be aware of the fact that nothing can be done in the country by local leaders without their full supports. Firstly, international actors must support a national reconciliation process; the state of insecurity is one of the main challenges facing the country, which emerged as a result of arm groups and conflicting parties. Though absence of peace keeping affected the country but nothing can be done in this present situation unless much effort is devoted toward national reconciliation dialogue. Such a process would lead to disarmament, facilitating constitution

making, and increase international actors' access to information about the capabilities and intentions of key Libyan groups (Imam M, Abba S & Wader M 2014, p.1163).

Secondly, international actors must try every mean to strengthen Libya's National Security Forces. The state of insecurity would not allow democracy to flourish in the country and one of the reasons for insecurity is attributed to lack of reliable national security forces. The recent attempt of U.S European efforts to train the so called "general-purpose force" of approximately 15,000 over the next several years would be more helpful in securing the country. Thirdly international actors should help Libya Strengthen Border Security. The susceptibility of Libyan borders gave chance to smuggling and the circulation of criminals and Jihadists, which undermine the security in the country. To provide solution to this problem might take time because it requires building institutional capacity in the country and also investments in monitoring capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. Fourthly international actors should help the country in building public administration. The repression under Gaddafi regime left the country with weak and faulty public administrative and bureaucratic structures (Imam M, Abba S & Wader M 2014, p.1164).

In A Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, the Rand Corporation identifies five basic priorities relevant to the Libyan case, which are; (1) securing the freedom of operation that institution-building requires; (2) providing basic infrastructure for the delivery of social services; (3) stabilizing the economic sector to ensure the basic functioning of markets and international trade; (4) democratization; and (5) economic development. The strategies and basic planning required to execute these priorities should come from Libyans, not from foreign governments and the assistance community, and should be geared toward the long term. According to NEDIFDS Report (2011, p.6) five factors were explained as what is needed to be in democratizing the country;

1. Institutional Constraints: A provisional government must be subjected to clear rules and constraints based on transparency, accountability, and limits on its own power.
2. Trust and Pre-emption of Fear: Trust outside of family and tribe, in particular through the support of civic associations working on broad-based social and political issues must be built.
3. Dealing with the Existing State Apparatus: A balance must be struck between the need to vet and, in some cases, prosecute Qaddafi loyalists and the need to integrate old and new regimes.

4. Transitional Justice: There will be need for establishment of a broadly representative and autonomous human rights commission to deal with rights violations in order to achieve justice and reconciliation.
5. Constitution and Elections: The new constitution should be drafted in a consultative and inclusive process that takes into account the need for local participation without triggering the kind of fragmentation that leads to policy paralysis and/or national disintegration. The electoral system should contribute to that goal through simplicity, transparency, and inclusivity.

CONCLUSION

It is easier to destroy than to amend anything in life. The process of transforming a conflict-prone state to a peaceful one is not a day work. It requires extra efforts and dedication from the governments, international actors and people of the country. Peace and democratic transition is a process that has no end in specific but to some extent, a state can be regarded as being democratic in nature. Libyan state can be democratized depending on the amount of energy devoted to democracy in the country. The country had a successful election in 2012, which shows that if care is adequately taken, democracy can become a reality. If we have to look at the stress and efforts needed to create in the country, we might get de-motivated to start anything but we must understand that the roadway to up is down and the journey of a thousand mile starts a day. In this respect, Libyan cannot be abandoned in this crisis and help has to come from somewhere. This project admonishes Libyan government, international actors and Libyan people to start the work of bringing peace to country collectively by looking into the several recommendations made in this project.

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